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CHAPTER 19 
Eminent Domain: Damages 
§19.1. Introduction. Under the power of eminent domain, private 
property may be taken for public purpose without the owner's con-
sent! through condemnation proceedings.2 The federal and most state 
constitutions, usually reinforced by statute, attach to the power of 
condemnation a requirement that no property may be taken by the 
government without "just compensation."s The courts have generally 
construed "just compensation" to mean the fair market value of the 
property at the time of the taking.4 Fair market value has been de-
fined as the highest price which a hypothetical willing buyer would 
pay to a hypothetical willing seller in a free and open market.5 Since 
fair market value is the highest price the hypothetical seller would 
pay, it is assumed that this price reflects the highest and best use of the 
property.6 
Generally, fair market value of property may be demonstrated in 
three ways: (1) by evidence of sales of property comparable to the 
property taken, (2) by evidence of income produced by the property, 
or (3) by evidence of replacement or reproduction costs of structures 
on the realty adjusted for depreciation and obsolescence (where such 
reproduction or replacement would be reasonable).7 The problems 
of when and how to use these different methods of property valuation 
in the determination of "just compensation" for property condemned 
are often quite difficult. 
The Supreme Judicial Court was presented with this type of difficult 
determination during the 1967 SURVEY year. In Commonwealth v. 
§19.1. ! Boom Co. v. Patterson. 98 U.S. 403 (1878); see 1 Nichols. The Law of 
Eminent Domain §§1.1-1.44 (3d ed. rev. 1964). 
2 The scope of this article is limited to valuation in general and will not discuss 
the special problems involved in particular kinds of takings or property interests. 
such as partial takings. leaseholds, or easements. For a discussion of these and 
other problems. see Spies and McCoid. Recovery of Consequential Damages in 
Eminent Domain, 48 Va. L. Rev. 437 (1962); Browder. The Condemnation of Future 
Interests, 48 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1962); Cromvell. Loss of Access to Highways: Different 
Approaches to the Problem of Compensation. 48 Va. L. Rev. 538 (1962). 
S E.g .• U.S. Const. amend. V; Mass. Const. art. 10. The obligation of providing 
compensation for property taken by eminent domain is now included in the con-
stitution of every state except North Carolina. The courts of North Carolina. how-
ever, recognize this obligation. 1 Nichols. note 1 supra, §4.8. 
4 E.g .• United States ex reI. T.V.A. v. Powelson. 319 U.S. 266 (1943); Tigar v. 
Mystic River Bridge Authority. 329 Mass. 514. 109 N.E.2d 148 (1952). 
5 Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority. 329 Mass. 514, 517, 109 N.E.2d 148, 
150 (1952). 
6 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246. 255-256 (1934). 
7 See 4 Nichols. The Law of Eminent Domain §§12.311-l2.3l3 (3d ed. rev. 1964). 
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Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,S the Court was confronted with 
the problem of evaluating "special purpose" property. Special purpose 
property may be defined as that property which is developed to meet 
the particular needs of its owner, usually a non-profit, charitable, or 
religious organization.9 The difficulties presented in evaluating special 
purpose property lie in the fact that such property does not produce 
income, nor does it have an active market. Usually, therefore, there 
will be no evidence of comparable sales or income to determine the 
value of special purpose property.10 
The Turnpike case involved the taking of an armory built during 
the nineteenth century. The armory was becoming obsolete and prob-
ably would have been replaced within fifteen years. The trial court 
held that the building was most valuable as an armory, but that it was 
not marketable for that purpose. The trial court also held that since 
there was no other evidence of value, evidence of reproduction cost 
of the armory, adjusted to reflect depreciation and obsolescence, was 
admissible to show value.H The Turnpike Authority excepted to ad-
missibility of the adjusted reproduction cost of the armory and ap-
pealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, asserting that because the 
armory was so obsolete, reproduction was unrealistic. The Authority 
contended that under these conditions, reproduction cost was irrele-
vant to determine value.12 The problem confronting the Court was 
that by not allowing adjusted reproduction cost of the armory as 
evidence of value, the Commonwealth was left without any of the tradi-
tional methods of demonstrating "just compensation." If the tradi-
tional methods of showing property value in condemnation proceed-
ings are irrelevant, the question arises as to what approaches should 
be allowed. In deciding such a question, a consideration must be 
given not only to what is relevant, but what is meaningful and 
understandable to an ordinary jury. 
The Turnpike case illustrates the magnitude of the problem con-
fronting the courts in formulating damages for condemnation pro-
ceedings. Even in cases which do not involve the valuation of special 
purpose property and in which the traditional approaches to valuation 
are appropriate, there is great difficulty in determining value. The 
problems are growing with the expansion of urban renewal and other 
governmental development programs which have initiated an increase 
in the number of people involved in condemnation.13 The problems 
81967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 224 N.E.2d 186. 
9 See Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 
Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
10 See 4 Nichols, note 7 supra, §12.32. 
111967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 389-391, 224 N.E.2d at 187-189. 
12Id. at 394-395, 224 N.E.2d at 190-191. 
13 See Hershman, Compensation - Just and Unjust, 21 Business Lawyer 285, 
289-290 (1966). An average of 111,080 families and 17,860 business and nonprofit 
organizations per year are expected to be displaced by federal and federally aided 
construction programs. Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition, House Com-
mittee on Public Works, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Study of Compensation and As-
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of condemnation, as construed by one eminent practitioner, are caused 
by the fact that condemnation concepts and procedures which were 
developed in nineteenth century agrarian society are being applied to 
evaluate property in an urban society with a different economy.14 
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has voiced 
great concern over the present confusion in the law of eminent do-
main: 
The condemnation law and procedure which developed in an 
agrarian period can no longer adequately protect the rights of 
our citizens. Wide variances exist between appraisers and the 
courts as to market value and the meaning of "just compensa-
tion." Furthermore, there are numerous items of damages result-
ing from a taking for which there is presently no compensation 
to a property owner. There are inconsistencies and inequities 
which have today no reason. Different allowances are granted, 
depending upon the agencies doing the condemning. Business 
losses are payable in certain communities and not in others in the 
State. The courts have recognized that in many respects the 
present law is unfair and inequitable. This is further evidenced, 
for example, by the decline in the value of properties following 
public announcements of possible acquisition .... 15 
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the means of award-
ing compensation for property taken in eminent domain. It will first 
be necessary to discuss the constitutional basis from which the right 
to compensation for property taken is derived. Then, the evolution 
of the fair market value concept as the method to best effect "just 
compensation" will be described and the different methods of measur-
ing fair market value will be demonstrated. The discussion will include 
a critique of the conventional fair market value concept. Possibilities 
for further compensation, such as consequential damages, will be con-
sidered. Although the rules of the state and federal courts of Massa-
chusetts will be emphasized,16 an examination of other jurisdictions is 
necessary for a complete understanding of the problem. 
The right to just compensation in a federal taking is derived from 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." 
In state or municipal takings, however, the right to just compensation 
is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, every con-
demnor, federal, state, or municipal, can only exercise its power of 
sistance for Persons Affected by Real Property Acquisition in Federal and Federally 
Assisted Programs 15 (Com. Print 1964). 
14 Hershman, note 13 supra, at 291. 
15 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Committee on State 
Legislation, Bulletin No.6, Memo 90, at 369 (1964). 
16 Condemnation proceedings for federal takings are generally initiated in federal 
courts which may formulate their own concepts of value and follow their own 
standards, 4 Nichols, note 7 supra, §12.I[3], at 34. 
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eminent domain by paying "just compensation" for private property 
taken by condemnation,17 The United States Supreme Court, however, 
has applied minimal standards when applying the standard of "just 
compensation" to the states. The Court has stated that only when a 
state court ruling prevented a landowner from obtaining substantially 
any compensation at all, will the case be overturned, even though a 
condemnee received much less than he should have.18 Hence, when 
a state court only awarded nominal damages of one dollar, but ex-
pressly recognized the right to recovery through its allowance of proof, 
the decision has been upheld.19 Since the last review by the United 
States Supreme Court of due process requirements of "just compensa-
tion" appears to have occurred over thirty years ago,20 the question 
remains whether the present Court would make the requirement 
more stringent today. 
Just compensation, as required by the Fifth Amendment, has been 
defined as an amount of money equal to the value of the property 
taken.21 In Massachusetts, the criterion for determining the value of 
property taken in condemnation proceedings is the fair market value 
of the property at the time of the taking.22 Through this standard, 
the courts attempt to discern the price the property would sell for in 
the free and open market.23 Fair market value has traditionally been 
the rule, even with special purpose properties which do not have a 
market, such as the armory in Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority.24 
Massachusetts has adopted the generally accepted definition of fair 
market value.25 Fair market value is equated with the price that could 
be obtained for the property under fair conditions as between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, when neither is acting under compulsion, 
necessity, or peculiar and special circumstances.26 Value to a particular 
owner or purchaser is rejected, and the value is that which the prop-
erty would have in the hands of any owner.27 
Since the value of property in the open market is based upon specu-
lation as to what it can be best used for, fair market value must reflect 
the highest and best use of the property.28 For this reason all available 
17 See 1 Nichols, note 1 supra, §4.8. 
18 McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913). 
19 Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co. v. Tanner, 239 U.S. 323 (1915). 
20 Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264 (1935). 
21 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943). 
22Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 517, 109 N.E.2d 148, 
150 (1952). 
23 See e.g., Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 Mass. 297, 58 N.E.2d 135 
(1944). 
24 See e.g., Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
254 Nichols, note 7 supra, §12.2[1]. 
26 Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N.E. 78 (1935). 
27 E.g., Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566, 137 N.E.2d 462, 
473 (1956). 
28 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See also Valley Paper Co. v. 
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uses and purposes which are reasonably probable must be considered.29 
This rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Olson v. 
United States: 
The sum required to be paid to the owner does not depend upon 
the uses to which he has devoted his land but is to be arrived at 
upon just consideration of all the uses for which it is suitable. 
The highest and most profitable use for which the property is 
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably 
near future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure 
of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for 
such use affects the market value while the property is privately 
held.so 
In Massachusetts, a judge has reasonable discretion in determining 
the extent to which a witness may explain his consideration of the uses 
to which the condemned property might have been put.31 The Massa-
chusetts courts have considered, for the determination of value, the 
possibility of securing necessary licenses to operate a gasoline filling 
station32 and the possibilities of residential subdivision.ss As the Olson 
case asserts, such possibilities may not necessarily be used as the 
measure of value, but may be used to show the full extent that the 
potential use has upon the market.34 
In order to understand the derivation and reasoning behind the 
fair market value rule, one must realize there are three possible ap-
proaches to the valuation of property: value to the owner, value to 
the taker, or a hypothetical market value which is objective and re-
flects the general market rather then the subjective needs of the 
individual parties.35 It is the last of these three approaches which has 
been adopted by Massachusetts as the fair market value concept.36 
Although it seems fair that value to the taker should be rejected 
as a measure of value so that a landowner may not take advantage 
of the government's special need for property,37 consideration of value 
to the owner may better effect just compensation.s8 It may be argued 
Holyoke Housing Authority, 346 Mass. 561, 194 N.E.2d 700 (1963), noted in 1964 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.25, 14.26, 22.4. 
29 See United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962). 
30292 U.S. 246, 255-256 (1934). 
31 In re Boston Edison Co., 341 Mass. 86, 166 N.E.2d 902 (1960). 
32 Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 138 N.E.2d 609 (1956). 
33 Aselbekian v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 341 Mass. 398, 169 N.E.2d 
863 (1960), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.7. 
34 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Southwick v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 339 
Mass. 666, 669-671, 162 N.E.2d 271, 274-275 (1959). 
35 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 5-6 (1949). 
36 E.g., Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566, 137 N.E.2d 
462, 473 (1956). 
37 See e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949). 
88 See Huber, Legal Rights of Persons Whose Businesses Are Displaced (1962); 
Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental 
Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61 (1957). 
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that the objective of just compensation should be to indemnify the 
property owner, putting him in the same position that he would have 
been in had the condemnation not occurred.39 In Boston Chamber of 
Commerce v. City of Boston,40 Justice Holmes discussed the "just 
compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment accordingly: 
It [the Fifth Amendment] merely requires that an owner of 
property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It 
deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is 
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.41 
Nevertheless, except in cases where there is absolutely no market, 
exemplified by special purpose property cases such as the Turnpike 
case, the courts have refused to determine the value of property taken 
as value to the owner.42 
Accordingly, losses incurred by the owner, which are incidental to 
the taking of the realty itself, have traditionally been excluded from 
value determination in condemnation proceedings. These non-com-
pensable losses include business expenses, such as loss of goodwill and 
moving expenses.43 The rationale advanced in favor of denying com-
pensation for incidental losses usually includes the argument that 
these interests are not property rights vis-a-vis the government.44 The 
reasoning is that the Fifth Amendment only provides compensation 
for what the government takes and since the condemnor usually takes 
only the realty, it need only pay for what it has gained, rather than for 
what the landowner has lost.45 A second argument for denying re-
covery of incidental losses is that such losses are speculative and sus-
ceptible to fraud, resulting in exaggerated awards.46 It appears, 
however, that the real underlying reason for denying compensation 
for incidental losses is a desire to keep the cost of public improvements 
down. In many cases, recovery for incidental losses would substantially 
increase the costs of condemnation.47 
39 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1942). 
40 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910). 
41 Id. at 195. 
421 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain §§37-46 (2d ed. 1953). 
43 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379-380 (1945). In many 
instances statutes have mitigated incidental losses. E.g., G.L., c. 79, §6A; G.L., c. 
79A, §§7, 10 (compensation for relocation expenses); 15 U.S.C. §636(b) (3) (1965) 
(loans for economic injury suffered as a result of displacement by a federally aided 
urban renewal or highway construction program). See Huber, note 38 supra. 
44 Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Inci-
dental Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61, 66·67 (1957). 
45 E.g., United States ex rei. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-284 (1943). 
46 E.g., Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 247, 65 N.E. 52, 53 (1902). 
47 In England, where "value to the owner" was the original standard of compensa-
tion adopted, it was felt that exaggerated awards resulted. For this reason the 
standard was modified but still considers value to the owner in the sense that 
compensation is allowed for incidental losses. See Land Compensation Act of 1961, 
9 Be 10 Eliz. 2, c. 33, §5; Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of 
Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61, 65-66, 72 (1957). 
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The arguments advanced for denying compensation for incidental 
losses are subject to criticism. Denial of incidental losses on the basis 
that interests lost are not taken as property conflicts with Justice 
Holmes' view that the Fifth Amendment deals with persons and not 
tracts of land.48 Also, the just compensation clause of many state con-
stitutions is formulated in terms of compensating the "person" rather 
than in terms of compensation for the property taken.49 
Although the courts uniformly deny using value to the owner or 
value to the taker as a measure of compensation, such values are often 
considered in the flexible application of the fair market value con-
cept.50 In frankly admitting that strict application of the fair market 
value concept is harsh, courts have often considered value to the 
owner to avoid injustice.51 Since many courts, however, do not exer-
cise their discretion to consider evidence of value to the owner under 
the guise of market value, there results unequal treatment of different 
condemnees.52 Some landowners are fully indemnified, including com-
pensation for incidental losses, while others are not. These incon-
sistencies in indemnification open to question whether the fair market 
value standard should be maintained as the measure of just com-
pensation for property taken in eminent domain. 53 
§19.2. Comparable sales. This section will cover the use of com-
parable sales to evaluate the opinion testimony of an expert ap-
praiser or as direct evidence of the condemned property's value.1 
There are two problems in using the comparable sales approach to 
property valuation. One danger is using the sales of properties which 
are not comparable to the condemned parce1.2 A second difficulty lies 
in the use of a sale which has not been freely made.3 The courts, 
therefore, require that an adequate foundation be established to 
demonstrate the comparability of the properties and lack of com-
pulsion in the sales before alleged comparable sales can be admitted 
48 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). But see, 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325-326 (1893). 
49 E.g., Mass. Const. art. X: "And whenever the public exigencies require that 
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall 
receive a reasonable compensation therefore." 
50 See United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1942). 
51 Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 
Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
52 Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Inci-
dental Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61, 74 (1957). 
53 For statistics on inconsistencies in Massachusetts and New York showing that 
appraisals based on fair market value may vary by more than one hundred percent, 
see id. at 73 nn.53-56. 
§19.2. 1Although there is a conflict of authority, see e.g., Frontage, Inc. v. 
Allegheny County, 413 Pa. 31, 195 A.2d 515 (1963), most courts follow the Massa-
chusetts rule admitting evidence of comparable sales as substantive evidence of 
value. 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain §21.3 (3d ed. rev. 1964). 
2 See 5 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31, at 430. 
3 See Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947); 5 Nichols, 
note I supra, §21.32, at 463. 
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into evidence.4 In determining comparability of sales the courts apply 
a number of tests to determine the similarity of the sales and prop-
erties. Such tests include: (1) geographical proximity of the realty; 
(2) similarity in the quality, the size, and the use of the realty; and (3) 
proximity in time of the sale.5 
In determining whether properties are comparable in terms of 
geographical proximity, two factors are generally taken into con-
sideration: (1) the distance between the two properties; (2) their rela-
tive situations with respect to business or residential advantages or 
disadvantages.6 Generally, for properties to be comparable they must 
be in the same immediate vicinity.7 It appears, however, that no pre-
cise rule as to what constitutes immediate vicinity has been formu-
lated. The fact that lands are in different towns does not make them 
non-comparable per se.8 In Boyd v. Lawrence Redevelopment Au-
thority,9 where there were no sales of comparable property nearby, 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the discretionary admission of 
sales of substantially similar properties several miles away in a dif-
ferent municipality. The properties were all zoned for industrial use 
and had similar access to high speed highways. The Court allowed the 
sales as comparable because of this similar access to transportation 
facilities, an important consideration for industrial development.1o 
As the Boyd case indicates, the concept of economic use is the ra-
tionale for disregarding a purely mathematical measure to determine 
whether properties are geographically comparable. The mitigation of 
the distance differential by modern facilities has diminished the im-
portance of geographical proximity as a criterion of comparability.H 
Vicinity is significant only to demonstrate that the properties have 
access to the same residential and business advantages.12 Highway 
access is important for business and industrial property, while shop-
ping center proximity is advantageous for residential parcels. Proximity 
to desirable business or residential advantages may so greatly affect 
values as to cause properties otherwise comparable to be held non-
comparable. In Brush Hill Development, Inc. v. Commonwealth,13 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court's exclusion of sales 
of properties which were several miles away in a different municipality, 
4 E.g., Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul v. Commonwealth, 
336 Mass. 357, 145 N.E.2d 681 (1957); 5 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31. 
55 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31. 
6 E.g., Teele v. Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N.E. 506 (1896); City of Chicago v. 
Harbecke, 409 Ill. 425, 100 N.E.2d 616 (1951). 
7 City of Chicago v. Harbecke, 409 Ill. 425, 430, 100 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1951). 
8 Knollman v. United States, 214 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1954); Gardner v. Brookline, 
127 Mass. 358 (1879). 
9348 Mass. 83, 202 N.E.2d 297 (1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.26. 
10 Id. at 85-86, 202 N.E.2d at 299. 
11 Hershman, Compensation- Just and Unjust, 21 Business Lawyer 285, 310-
311 (1966). 
125 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31[1], at 448. 
13338 Mass. 359, 155 N.E.2d 170 (1959). 
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because the offered properties lacked equality with the condemned 
property in distance from public highways. Similarly, courts have 
denied admissibility for sales where the properties differ in access to 
convenient shopping areas.14 
The second test of the comparability of two parcels of property for 
purposes of determining fair market value, involves determining dif-
ferences with respect to the quality, size, and use of the properties. 
To determine whether such disparities exist, consideration must be 
given to factors like zoning, subdivision and the presence or lack of 
improvements.15 Both properties must have comparable potential 
for their highest and best use even though they may not be so utilized. 
In looking to potential for highest and best use, rather than actual 
utilization, the courts recognize that future development of real estate 
has a great effect on market value.16 All of these considerations lead 
to the question of determining when the differences are so great as to 
prohibit a finding that the properties are comparable. 
Differences in zoning and use can make two properties, otherwise 
comparable, non-comparable.17 Generally, however, the trial judge has 
great discretion in determining whether to admit evidence of com-
parable sales.18 For example, sales of nearby property zoned for less 
restrictive use may in the discretion of the court be either admitted 
or excluded. In Gregori v. City of Springfield, The Supreme Judicial 
Court held: 
[T]he sale price of other property ... situated in a different zone 
(whether more or less restrictive) from that of the property taken 
is a factor to be considered by the trial judge in ruling on its 
admissibility. But there should be no hard and fast rule that a 
difference in zones in and of itself renders such evidence inad-
missible.19 
Another problem in determining comparability is whether sub-
divided land may be found comparable with land which is not 
subdivided. Although there appear to be no cases in Massachusetts on 
point, there is a strong trend in the decisions of other jurisdictions 
indicating that land which is subdivided into lots cannot be found 
comparable with undeveloped acreage.20 These holdings are generally 
based on the fact that the sale price of land which is not subdivided 
does not reflect the costs of subdivision development. Such costs 
might include planning, sewer, pipeline, and street expenses, depend-
14 E.g., Winepol v. State Roads Commission of Maryland, 220 Md. 227, 151 A.2d 
723 (1959). 
155 Nichols, note I supra, §2I.31[3]. 
16 Cf. State v. Earl, 345 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1961). 
17 E.g., Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul v. Commonwealth, 
336 Mass. 357, 145 N.E.2d 681 (1957). 
18 Leen v. Assessors of Boston, 345 Mass. 494, 188 N.E.2d 460 (1963). 
19348 Mass. 395, 397, 204 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §14.26. 
20 5 Nichols, note I supra, §2I.31[3] at 459-460. 
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ing on how far the subdivision development of the property in ques-
tion has progressed.21 Nevertheless, in United States v. Iriarte, the 
First Circuit denied the government's contention that lot sales of other 
property could not be used to indicate the value of undeveloped 
acreage.22 The court said that not considering the value of lot sales 
would be ignoring the highest and best use of the property for sub-
division development. The First Circuit did qualify its holding by 
warning that evidence of the sale price of lots could be misused in 
evaluating undeveloped acreage and that the lower court would have 
erred if it had simply multiplied the number of square meters in the 
land to be condemned by the average price per square meter of de-
veloped land, as that method of valuation would not have accounted 
for the development costs of subdivision.23 
The dangers inherent in decisions like Iriarte lie in the fact that 
comparison of the sales price of subdivided property with that of raw 
acreage is very speculative. The jury must speculate as to the value 
of lots which do not yet exist and how that should affect present 
value. It appears that the admission of evidence of subdivided property 
should be carefully limited to a demonstration of highest and best use 
and to the effect that the possibility of development may have on 
market value.24 
Another degree of similarity which must be considered to test the 
comparability of properties is the size of land. Some courts, including 
those in Massachusetts, have excluded evidence of allegedly com-
parable sales where the size of the properties has varied substantially.25 
The theory is that large and small pieces of land cannot be applied 
profitably to the same use.26 
The third test for determining whether comparable sales may be 
offered as evidence of fair market value concerns proximity of the 
time of the sale to the date of valuation. The time of the sale is im-
portant in determining its comparability because, within a short time 
period, there may be a change in the real estate market or the 
economy.27 Using the test of relevance, however, a sale before the date 
of taking may be admissible if it can be shown that it furnishes a test 
of present value.28 Hence, in Massachusetts, and generally elsewhere, 
there is no fixed space of time within which sales must have taken 
place in order to be admissible. The circumstances of each case, in-
cluding the degree of economic change, will control.29 
21 See State Roads Commission v. Wood, 207 Md. 369, 114 A.2d 636 (1954). 
22 166 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1948). 
23 Id. at 804. 
24 See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). 
25 E.g., Teele v. Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 42 N.E. 506 (1896). 
265 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31[3], at 458. 
27 Hershman, Compensation - Just or Unjust, 21 Business Lawyer 285, 313 
(1966). 
285 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.31[2]. 
29 E.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 164 Mass. 107, 41 N.E. 132 (1895). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/22
320 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §19.2 
Generally, sales made after the date of taking are inadmissible.so 
In Massachusetts, most takings occur under General Laws, Chapter 
79, which provides, in part, that "the damages for property taken 
under this chapter shall be fixed at the value thereof before the 
taking. . . ."31 These words have been construed to mean "before the 
beginning of the public work which necessitates the taking."32 Thus, 
the value of the property will not be affected by the taking itself.33 
Sales made after the date of taking might reflect an increment of en-
hancement or diminution due to the taking, and, thus, should not be 
considered comparable.34 There are some Massachusetts cases, how-
ever, which have held contrary to the general rule and allowed sales 
after the date of taking where there was no showing of enhancement.35 
In the recent case of Alden v. Commonwealth,36 the Supreme Judicial 
Court sustained an exception to the exclusion of evidence demonstrat-
ing the enhancement of certain sales due to the anticipated benefits 
of the government highway project. The sales which had occurred 
subsequent to the beginning of the project were admitted as evidence 
of the value of the property taken. In sustaining the exception the 
court stated that even subsequent sales which reflected enhancement 
need not always be excluded. The Court said that with careful, limit-
ing instructions, knowledge of such a sale may aid the jury's valua-
tion.37 
An additional criterion for determining whether a sale is admissible 
as evidence is whether it was effected freely and not under compulsion. 
Unless sales are made in a free and open market, they cannot be 
considered comparable.3s A sale made as the result of judicial process, 
such as execution, foreclosure, or condemnation, is considered forced 
and not free.39 In Massachusetts, however, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that every sale is voluntary.40 
The rule is well stated in Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority,41 
where exception was taken to the admission of a sale which had been 
made by a bank as the result of a mortgage foreclosure. The objection 
was made that the sale was only for the amount of the mortgage and 
30 International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955). 
31 G.L., c. 79, §12. 
32 Connor v. Metropolitan District Water Supply Comm'n, 314 Mass. 33, 49 
N.E.2d 593 (1943). 
33 Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959), noted in 1959 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §20.7. 
34Id. 
35 E.g., Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 350 Mass. 485, 215 
N.E.2d 652 (1966). 
36351 Mass. 83, 217 N.E.2d 743 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§15.27, 25.2. 
37Id. at 87, 217 N.E.2d at 746. 
38 Suburban Land Co. v. Arlington, 219 Mass. 539, 107 N.E. 432 (1914). 
395 Nichols, note 1 supra, §§21.32, 21.33. 
40 Ramacorti v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 341 Mass. 377, 170 N.E.2d 323 
(1960). 
41317 Mass. 297, 58 N.E.2d 135 (1944). 
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not made freely for fair market value. However, no evidence was 
introduced on this point except that the Court was asked to take 
judicial notice that property held by a bank is not sold for fair market 
value since a bank is only interested in recovering the amount of its 
mortgage. The Court refused to take such notice and overruled the 
exception.42 The Court asserted that although the burden of proof 
that a price was fixed by fair bargaining and not by compulsion is on 
the party offering the price as evidence of value, there is a presump-
tion of a free sale in favor of such party.43 The Court found that there 
was not sufficient evidence offered in this case to rebut the presump-
tion.44 
A problem raised by the admissibility of comparable sales data is 
whether a foundation of firsthand knowledge of the sale will be re-
quired to avoid violating the hearsay evidence rule. Generally, com-
parable sales data, when used as direct evidence of the condemned 
property's value, will not be admitted unless the testimony is based on 
firsthand knowledge.45 When comparable sales data is offered only 
to evaluate the opinion testimony of an expert appraiser, however, 
courts are in disagreement as to its admissibility.46 Three states, in-
cluding Massachusetts, take the position that evidence of comparable 
sales obtained from secondary sources is hearsay evidence, although 
used only to establish a basis for an expert's opinion or to challenge 
the opinion.47 Justice Holmes asserted the rationale for this view in 
National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford: "An expert may testify 
to value although his knowledge of details is chiefly derived from 
inadmissible sources, because he gives the sanction of his general 
experience. But the fact that an expert may use hearsay as a ground 
of opinion does not make the hearsay admissible."48 
The First Circuit has made discretionary the admissibility of the 
sales price of comparable sales on direct examination without requir-
ing a foundation of firsthand knowledge when used only to sub-
stantiate an appraisal opinion.49 Other courts have adopted this view, 
but the weight of authority, including most federal courts, readily 
admits evidence of the sales price of comparable sales without a show-
ing of firsthand knowledge if used to substantiate the expert ap-
praiser's opinion.50 
The Massachusetts rule that evidence of comparable sales obtained 
from secondary sources is hearsay under all conditions appears to be 
42Id. at 298, 58 N.E.2d at 137. 
43Id. at 301, 58 N.E.2d at 138. 
44Id. at 302, 58 N.E.2d at 139. 
455 Nichols, note 1 supra, §21.3[1], at 431-432. 
46 State v. Oakley, 356 S.W.2d 909, 911-912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). 
47 Missouri and Colorado concur with the Massachusetts rule. Id. at 912. 
48175 Mass. 251, 257, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900). 
49 Bailey v. United States, 325 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1963). 
50 E.g., United States v. Lowrie, 246 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1957); Delaware, Lacka-
wanna & Western R.R. v. Hoboken, 16 N.J. Super. 543, 556-558, 85 A.2d 200, 206-207 
(1951). 
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unreasonable. In an urban community, an expert appraisal witness 
cannot possibly be a party to every sale of realty. At least, the courts 
should have discretion to admit evidence of comparable sales obtained 
from secondary sources, especially when requiring first hand knowledge 
would place a hardship on the party offering the evidence. 
The use of comparable sales as a criterion of valuation has been 
assailed on a number of grounds. First, it has been said that the intro-
duction of such evidence obscures with irrelevant issues the main 
issue of "just compensation."51 The basis of this contention is that the 
trial becomes concerned with the properties offered for comparable 
sales as opposed to the specific property to be valued.52 Secondly, it 
has been contended that past sales, no matter how comparable, cannot 
truly reflect market value of the property in question.53 In addition, 
the argument has been asserted that to allow evidence of comparable 
sales is inconsistent with the theory that all property is unique.54 
Despite these objections, comparable sales still appear to be the best 
and most workable evidence in establishing the value of condemned 
property. 55 
In Massachusetts eminent domain cases, it is well settled that the 
admissibility of sales offered as comparable is entirely discretionary 
with the trial judge.56 The judge may admit evidence of the sale of 
such land if he feels it will aid the jurors in their determination and 
will not tend to mislead and confuse them.57 Nevertheless, the discre-
tion is not unlimited and will be reversed when shown to be mani-
festly erroneous.58 Such error has been construed to mean denying a 
party the power of proving the value of the property.59 Where there 
are reasonable similarities between properties sold freely, sales offered 
as comparable should be admitted, with the dissimilarities affecting 
only the weight of the testimony as opposed to its competency. 
§19.3. Income analysis. Many real estate parcels located in urban 
areas are owned specifically for the rental income they produce. Ex-
pansive urban renewal programs have greatly increased the number 
of takings which involve such properties. For this reason, the problems 
of evaluating income producing properties have become more signifi-
51 See In re Thompson, 127 N.Y. 463, 28 N.E. 389 (1891). 
52Id. 
53 Lum, Comparison and Use of Market Data in Preparation for Expert Testi-
mony, 31 Appraisal J. 178, 181 (1963). 
54 Sengstock. and McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain? 44 J. of 
Urban Law 185, 193 (1966). 
55 American Bar Association, 1966 Report of Committee on Condemnation and 
Condemnation Procedure, Section of Local Government Law pt. I, at 28 (1966). 
Even in jurisdictions whose common law originally did not allow comparable sales, 
statutes have been enacted which now allow this evidence. E.g., N.Y. Court of 
Claims Act §16 (McKinney 1963). 
56 Wright v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass. 371, 190 N.E. 593 (1934). 
57 E.g., Iris v. Hingham, 303 Mass. 401, 22 N.E.2d 13 (1939). 
58Id. 
59 Cf. Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
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cant. The capitalization of rental income is an approved approach for 
determining the value of income producing properties taken in emi-
nent domain.1 The income capitalization technique involves capitaliz-
ing net rental income.2 This technique may be used as the sole criterion 
for determining value when there are no comparable sales available, 
or in conjunction with comparable sales as a check on their validity.3 
The following discussion will describe the income capitalization tech-
nique for determining the value of revenue producing properties and 
the problems which this approach raises. 
The theory of income capitalization is an investor's concept predi-
cated on the principle that the value of property is established by 
expected income to the owner.4 Accordingly, the value of property is 
equal to the investment which, given the normal rate of return on 
similar investments in the same location, yields the same annual net 
income.5 Net income is the revenue received after deducting the 
expenses of maintaining the property. An example will best illustrate 
the basic method. 
Assuming a rate of return at five percent on capital investment, 
what is the amount of investment necessary to return the sum of 
$2500 in net income? Generally, annual net income may be computed 
by multiplying capital investment by a predicted rate of return. There-
fore, when annual net income and the capitalization rate are known, 
the investment required to generate the annual net income may be 
obtained by dividing the annual net income by the capitalization 
rate. 
In algebraic terms: 
(Capital Investment) (Capitalization Rate) = Net Income 
Capital Investment = Net Income/Capitalization Rate 
Applied to the example: 
(Capital Investment) (.05) = $2500 
Capital Investment = $2500/.05 
Capital Investment = $50,000 
Thus, a $50,000 capital investment is required to yield an annual net 
income of $2500 where there is a five percent rate of return (capitali-
zation rate). It can be seen that the validity of the capitalization 
technique depends on the accuracy of the income and capitalization 
figures. 
It is generally held that rental income is admissible to determine 
§19.3. 14 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain §§12.312-12.3122 (3d ed. rev. 1964), 
5 id. §§19.1-19.23. 
2Id. §19.23. 
3 American Bar Association, 1966 Report of Committee on Condemnation and 
Condemnation Procedure, Section of Local Government Law pt. I, at 35 (1966). 
4 See Wagner, A Defense of the Income Approach, 3d Ann. Inst. on Eminent 
Domain 151, 178-179 (1961). 
5 See Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. City of New Britain, 20 
Conn. Sup. 476, 140 A.2d 324 (C.P. 1958). 
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the value of the property taken,6 while business income is inadmis-
sible.7 Rental income is allowed because it inheres in the property 
itself. Since it results directly from the realty, the rental income indi-
cates a transferrable value which is stable and predictable.s Business 
income, on the other hand, does not inhere in the property. Rather, 
this income might well be derived on other premises also. Business 
income is determined to a great extent by managerial talents and, 
therefore, is unpredictable as a measure of realty value.9 Thus, in 
Amory v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court stated: 
The income received from the use and occupation of land is 
evidence of its market value ... but income derived from a busi-
ness conducted upon the premises depends upon various factors 
not attributable to the land and furnishes no criterion for the 
determination of the market value of the land.10 
In utilizing the income capitalization technique, it is important 
that the rental income figure be accurate. The appraiser must be 
certain that a net rental income is used whereby all the expenses of 
maintaining the rental property, including taxes, vacancy allowances 
and depreciation are deducted.H Also, the rental income figure must 
reflect normal market rentals. If it is shown that the income used in 
capitalization does not represent normal market levels, such evidence 
may be inadmissible.12 
There are many reasons why the actual net rent may be above or 
below the normal market levels. The lease may reflect a high or low 
rental demand at the time of its writing.1s The existence of a tenant 
6 E.g., Chicago, B. & O. R. Co. v. North Kansas City Dev. Co., 134 F.2d 142 (8th 
Cir. 1943); Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947); Marjal 
Realty Corp. v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 941, 259 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1965). 
7 E.g., Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947); In re City 
of Rochester, 234 App. Div. 583, 255 N.Y.S. 801 (1932). Only where the taking 
affects the business so that it is unable to be reestablished is business income admis-
sible as evidence of value. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). 
S Hershman, Compensation-Just and Unjust, 21 Business Lawyer 285, 316 
(1966). The rental value of property which is similar to the condemned property 
is not considered SUfficiently relevant to be admissible. Wenton v. Commonwealth, 
335 Mass. 78, 138 N.E.2d 609 (1956), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.4, 33.6. 
9 Sauer v. New York, 44 App. Div. 305, 308-309, 60 N.Y.S. 648, 650-651 (1899). 
Although, in Massachusetts, injury to business conducted on the condemned prop-
erty is not compensable, H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 316, 214 
N.E.2d 721 (1966), evidence of the volume of business conducted may be admissible, 
at the discretion of the court, to demonstrate the adaptability of the land for the 
use to which it was put. Wellington v. City of Cambridge, 220 Mass. 312, 107 N.E. 
976 (1915). 
10321 Mass. 240, 258, 72 N.E.2d 549, 560 (1947) (citations omitted). 
11 Sengstock and McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain? 44 J. 
Urban Law 185, 212 (1966). 
12 See Carlstrom v. United States, 275 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1960); In re City of 
New York, 196 App. Div. 451, 188 N.Y.S. 197 (1921). 
13 E.g., United States v. 396 Corp., 264 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 
U.S. 817 (1959). 
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who is special, as a relative, may affect the rent.14 Also, the building 
may not have been put to its highest and best use and thereby not 
reflect its potential income.15 
Like the income figure, it is important that the capitalization rate 
be accurate to insure the validity of the income capitalization tech-
nique. The choice of capitalization rate is very difficult because the 
rate of return on investments is a variable factor which changes with 
the time, location, and nature of the investment. The capitalization 
rate is necessarily an assumed figure selected by an appraiser after 
considering the existing earning rates on investments generally. All 
the vagaries of the investment market must be considered, but the 
most important consideration is the rental market. The appraiser 
must investigate the rate of return on comparable properties in the 
same area as the property taken.16 
The difficulties of the income capitalization technique lie in deter-
mining the validity of the income figure and capitalization rate. A 
great variation in property value will accrue from a small variation 
in capitalization rate. A lower rate will produce a higher capitalized 
value while a higher rate will produce a lower value. For example, 
$5000 of annual income capitalized at 5 percent will result in a capital 
sum of $100,000, while the same income capitalized at ten percent 
will result in a $50,000 capitalization. In the above example, each 
percentage difference in capitalization rate will represent a $10,000 
difference in property value. Consequently, many courts allow capitali-
zation of income only where evidence of sales of comparable property 
is not available,17 Capitalization of income may also act as a check on 
other methods of valuation.18 
§19.4. Reproduction costs. If the property to be valued is im-
proved, a third approach to valuation may be employed, utilizing the 
reproduction costs of the improvements. The use of reproduction 
costs is based upon the classical economic theory that the value of any 
commodity is equal to its reconstruction costs reduced by deprecia-
tion.1 Applying this theory to real estate appraisal in condemnation 
proceedings, compensation would be determined as the summation 
of the values of the land plus the reproduction costs of the structures 
adjusted for depreciation.2 This economic theory is unsound, how-
14 Sifuentes v. United States, 168 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1948). 
15 Sengstock and McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain? 44 J. Urban 
Law 185, 213 (1966). 
16In re James Madison Houses, 17 App. Div. 2d 317, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1962). 
17 American Bar Association, 1966 Report of Committee on Condemnation and 
Condemnation Procedure, Section of Local Government Law pt. 1, at 35 (1966). 
18 See United States v. Eden Memorial Park Assn., 350 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1965); 
Hershman, Compensation - Just and Unjust, 21 Business Lawyer 285, 315 (1966). 
§19.4. 12 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain §188 (2d ed. 
1953). 
2E.g., In re City of New York-Blackwell's Island Bridge, 198 N.Y. 84, 91 N.E. 
278 (1910). 
16
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ever, because it fails to account for the impact of supply and demand 
upon the market. Unless a building is one in special demand, it will 
not be as valuable to a buyer who could buy vacant land and build 
a new structure suitable to his needs.s For this reason, the market 
value of the property may be below the value of the land plus re-
production costs of the improvements, even after adjusting for de-
preciation. Unless there is a special premium on the buildings, this 
inflated value will set an absolute ceiling on the market price.4 
This inflationary nature of reproduction costs has caused the courts 
to hold that reproduction costs can never be utilized as a direct test 
of value.5 Some courts do admit reproduction costs as evidence to be 
considered in determining value, but there is much confusion and 
many problems surrounding this admissibility.6 The following section 
will discuss the difficulties in using reproduction costs of improve-
ments as evidence of value for property taken by eminent domain. 
Since fair market value is the measure of compensation for con-
demned property, consideration of the value of improvements is 
limited to the extent that the improvements affect the market value 
of the property.7 When the cost of improvements has no ascertainable 
bearing on the value of property, e.g., an expensive mansion in a slum 
section, consideration of reproduction costs should be excluded.s 
When it is shown, however, that the value of improvements affects 
the value of property because they are "reasonably adapted" to the 
land, reproduction costs, adjusted for depreciation, are an indication 
of the amount by which the improvements enhance the property.9 
"Reasonable adaptability" means that a prudent owner of the land 
might wish to replace the improvement, if it were destroyed, with a 
substantially identical substitute.1o This concept was well expressed 
by the New York Court of Appeals in In re City of New York-
Blackwell's Island Bridge: 
In some cases the value of expensive structures may not enhance 
the value of the land at all. An extremely valuable piece of land 
may have upon it cheap structures which are a detriment rather 
than an improvement. A man may build an expensive mansion 
upon a barren waste, and, in such a case, the costly building may 
add little or nothing to the total value. In the greater number of 
cases, however, when the character of the structures is well 
S 2 Orgel, note I supra, §188. 
4 United States v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960). 
5 See Bachelder Truck Sales, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 270, 273, 214 
N.E.2d 36, 38 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§15.26, 15.27. 
6 E.g., Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581 (1923); Levenson v. 
Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 75, 77 N.E. 635 (1906). 
74 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain §12.313, at 137 (3d ed. rev. 1964). 
S E.g., Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 162 F. 633 (6th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 212 
U.S. 577 (1908). 
94 Nichols, note 7 supra, §12.313, at 137-139. 
10 See 2 Orgel, note 1 supra, §191. 
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adapted to the kind of land upon which they are erected, the 
value of the buildings does enhance the value of the land.H 
Thus, reproduction costs, less depreciation, are generally admissible 
as evidence of value if it is shown that the improvements are reason-
ably adapted to the land.12 A further requirement is that the prices 
upon which reproduction cost is calculated are normal and not in-
flated.13 An examination of the cases discussing the competence of 
reproduction cost evidence, however, reveals that admissibility of such 
evidence is generally a matter of discretion with the trial courtH and 
that there is great uncertainty in this area. Some courts do not impose 
conditions on the admissibility of such evidence and allow it to be 
considered with other evidence of value.15 Other courts predicate 
admissibility on the jury being convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that substantial reproduction of the improvement would be a 
reasonable business venture.16 Many decisions have required a showing 
of the necessity for the use of reproduction cost as evidence before 
allowing admissibility.17 In these cases, evidence of reproduction cost 
has been allowed in the valuation of special purpose properties18 or 
where there are no available comparable sales or income that can be 
ca pi talized.19 
A minority of courts forbid the use of reproduction costs as evidence 
to determine the value of condemned property.2Q The rationale for 
not allowing this evidence is based upon the unit rule of valuation.21 
This rule prohibits consideration of the value of improvements except 
as integral parts of the property. Market value must be determined by 
viewing the land and improvements as a whole. Under the unit rule, 
reproduction costs are inadmissible because such evidence shows the 
value of the buildings separate and apart from the land itself.22 
In Massachusetts, it had been held that the admissibility of reproduc-
11198 N.Y. 84, 86·87, 91 N.E. 278, 279 (1910). 
12 United States v. 206.82 Acres of Land, 205 F. Supp. 91 (M.D. Pa. 1962). 
13 E.g., United States v. Boston C.C. & N.Y. Canal Co., 217 F. 877 (1st Cir. 1921). 
14 See United States v. 206.82 Acres of Land, 205 F. Supp. 91, 93 (M.D. Pa. 1962). 
15 E.g., Hickey v. United States, 208 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1953); In re City of New 
York - Blackwell's Island Bridge, 198 N.Y. 84, 91 N.E. 278 (1910). 
16 E.g., United States v. Buhler, 305 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962). 
17 United States v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1960). 
18 E.g., Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
19 E.g., Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N.E.2d 148 
(1952). 
20 E.g., Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Lotta, 27 Ill. 2d 455, 189 
N.E.2d 238 (1963). 
215 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain §20.2[2], at 386-387 (3d ed. rev. 1964); 
but see United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526, 528 (2d Cir. 1948). 
22 Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Lotta, 27 Ill. 2d 455, 456-458, 
189 N.E.2d 238, 240-241 (1963). It has been held under the minority view that an 
appraiser may consider reproduction costs in determining his opinion of value, 
although the cost of reproduction itself may not be introduced to the jury as direct 
evidence of value. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Pellini, 7 Ill. 2d 
367, 373, 131 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1955). 
18
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tion costs as evidence to determine value is discretionary,23 although 
recent cases seem to limit the use of such evidence to the valuation of 
special purpose properties where no evidence of value in the form 
of comparable sales or income capitalization is available.24 The prob-
lem of utilizing reproduction costs to evaluate special purpose prop-
erty faced the Court in Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority.25 It will be recalled that the Authority had excepted to the 
admissibility of adjusted reproduction cost of the armory, contending 
that since the structure was obsolete, reproduction was untenable and, 
therefore, evidence of reproduction cost was irrelevant to determine 
value. The Court agreed and sustained the exception asserting that, 
where structures are so out-of-date that they would not be reproduced 
by a prudent owner, it is difficult for even an expert to make suitable 
allowances for depreciation.26 
The Court, however, recognized that although a structure taken by 
eminent domain has become obsolete to the extent that to allow evi-
dence of reproduction cost would be prejudicial, it may still have a 
residual useful value to the owner for the special purpose which it 
serves.27 This "residual value" might have been maintained long after 
the taking occurred and may exceed what the land and structures 
will bring in the ordinary real estate market. In applying the prin-
ciple of "residual value" to the taking of the armory, the Court defined 
residual useful value as the fair value of having available the old 
structure or a reasonable replacement structure during the useful life 
of the old armory, plus the value of being able to postpone expendi-
ture for a new structure.28 
The Court suggested that the total value of the Commonwealth's 
property could be computed by a summation of the land value plus 
the "residual useful value" of the armory. In the opinion, Justice 
Cutter suggested summation of the following elements for computing 
"residual useful value": (1) interest on the investment presently neces-
sary to finance a suitable modern replacement structure, (2) the 
depreciation value that would accrue on a suitable replacement 
structure if it were built at the time of the taking. Both of these 
figures are to be computed over a period equal to the remaining 
useful life of the structure.29 The Court, however, qualified the ap-
plication of the residual useful value method by holding that any 
expert appraiser's computation of residual value is not to be con-
sidered by the jury as direct evidence but only states the basis of the 
appraiser's ultimate opinion.so 
23 James Millar Co. v. Commonwealth, 251 Mass. 457, 146 N.E. 677 (1925). 
24 E.g., Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 
335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956); but see Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Con-
solidated Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 34 N.E.2d 623 (1941). 
251967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 224 N.E.2d 186. 
26Id. at 395, 224 N.E.2d at 191. 
27Id. 
28Id. at 396, 224 N.E.2d at 191. 
29Id. at 396, 224 N.E.2d at 191. 
30Id. at 396-397, 224 N.E.2d at 191-192. 
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The residual value theory recognized in its first elements - the 
interest on the investment necessary to finance a suitable replacement 
structure - that a property owner could invest his capital alternatively 
to produce income if he did not have to invest in a new structure to 
replace the condemned building. The theory, therefore, compensates 
for lost interest on a hypothetical investment. The second element 
recognizes the remaining useful life of the old structure which has 
been taken. 
For example, if a building with a reasonable replacement cost of 
$100,000 and a remaining useful life of five years is condemned, its 
residual useful value could be computed as follows (Assume five per-
cent return on investments and depreciation of $5000 per year on 
replacement) : 
Interest on investment (first element) = $100,000 X 5% X 5 
years = $25,000 
Depreciation on investment (second element) = $5000 X 5 = 
$25,000 
Residual useful value = $25,000 + $25,000 = $50,000 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kirk agreed with the majority that 
admission of the reproduction cost of an obsolete building, such as 
the armory, to prove value would be irrelevant and confusing. Justice 
Kirk, however, felt that consideration of the cost of a suitable replace-
ment structure to determine the residual value would be equally con-
fusing and irrelevant. Since a suitable replacement structure would 
require completely different facilities, Justice Kirk felt that presenta-
tion of evidence of such a structure would result in a "blizzard" of 
facts and figures obscuring the simple question of "just compensa-
tion" to be resolved. For this reason, he favored the maintenance of a 
general fair market value rule which would include "residual useful 
value" by alluding to it without a presentation of confusing facts and 
figures concerning replacement value.111 
The Court, in the Turnpike case, seemed to follow its opinion in 
Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity.32 Newton Girl Scout involved the partial taking of special purpose 
property in the form of a girl scout camp. Since camps of this type 
were not commonly bought and sold, the girl scout council was forced 
to prove damages by means other than comparable sales. The trial 
judge excluded evidence bearing on the value of the property for 
special uses for which it had been adapted and maintained a general 
market value concept. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that although market value is the test, the Girl Scouts were entitled 
to present evidence bearing on every use to which the property was 
adapted, including the specialized use for which the property was 
being employed, i.e., a camp, and all relevant factors pertaining to its 
31Id. at 397-398, 224 N.E.2d at 192-193 (Kirk, j., concurring opinion). 
32335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). 
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use. The Court felt that in special purpose property cases greater 
flexibility in presentation of evidence is necessary and asserted that 
the testimony should be allowed of a witness who was an expert on the 
value of camp property in general rather than an expert in local 
property values, as traditionally required.ss 
Also, the Court held that evidence of reproduction cost less deprecia-
tion should be admitted because intrinsic value of the property is a 
proper means of ascertaining the value of special purpose property.84 
In asserting this attitude of flexibility toward the admission of evi-
dence in cases involving special purpose property, the Court stated: 
Special opportunities for proof of value have long been afforded 
in cases where it is felt that there is no market value, in the sense 
in which, in most communities, market value is at all times re-
flected by a steady volume of sales of ordinary commercial and 
residential properties .... The courts in these cases, however, may 
be doing no more than recognizing that more complex and re-
sourceful methods of ascertaining value must be used when the 
property is unusual or specialized in character and where ordinary 
methods will produce a miscarriage of justice. In such cases, it is 
proper to determine market value from the intrinsic value of the 
property and from its value for the special purposes for which it 
is adapted and used.311 
Since special purpose properties usually do not produce rental in-
come, nor are they ordinarily bought or sold, the usual means of as-
certaining market value are not available for the valuation of such 
property. Thus, other means must be resorted to.36 Although in 
Massachusetts the burden is on the owner to first show that it is im-
possible to prove the value of property without resorting to unusual 
methods of valuation,37 it is generally proper, in evaluating special 
purpose property, to determine market value from the intrinsic value 
of the property to the owner for its special purpose.S8 
It is the consideration of the intrinsic value of the property to the 
owner for its special purpose that would be effected by allowing evi-
dence of "residual useful value." Since there was no capitalized in-
come or comparable sales evidence available to determine the value 
of the armory in Turnpike, reproduction costs would ordinarily have 
been proper to demonstrate the intrinsic value of the property to the 
owner for its special purpose.39 When the Court necessarily rejected 
88Id. at 194-195, Hl8 N.E.2d at 773. 
84!d. at 195·196, 138 N.E.2d at 773·774. 
85Id. at 195, 138 N.E.2d at 773·774. 
86 Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 
Mass. 189, 195, 138 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1956). 
87 Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N.E.2d 148 (1952). 
88Id. 
89 Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
389, 394, 224 N.E.2d 186, 190. 
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the use of reproduction costs as irrelevant, however, the Common-
wealth was left without conventional means of demonstrating value. 
Although, as Justice Kirk suggested, the introduction of replacement 
value to show residual value may be confusing to the jury,40 it seems 
preferable to admit such evidence in cases where general standards 
of market value would not allow any proof. The allowance of evi-
dence demonstrating residual useful value would provide a means for 
the Commonwealth's appraiser to demonstrate the state's loss from the 
taking. Because of the difficulties alluded to by Justice Kirk, however, 
it appears that the use by an appraiser of extraordinary methods 
of valuation, like reproduction cost or residual value approaches, 
should be limited to the valuation of property for which there is a 
paucity of the more reliable comparable sales or capitalized income 
data.41 
The flexible attitude toward the admissibility of evidence demon-
strating intrinsic value to the owner in cases involving special purpose 
property should be extended to all cases to allow the introduction of 
evidence demonstrating incidental losses to the owner, such as damage 
to business or moving expenses. Only if such evidence is admitted 
will the owner of property taken under eminent domain be assured 
of full compensation. The Supreme Court has recognized that market 
value cannot necessarily be equated to just compensation: 
The court in its construction of the constitutional provision has 
been careful not to reduce the concept of "just compensation" 
to a formula. The political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amend-
ment reject confiscation as a measure of justice. But the Amend-
ment does not contain any definite standards of fairness by which 
the measure of "just compensation" is to be determined .... 
The Court in an endeavor to find working rules that will do 
substantial justice had adopted practical standards including that 
of market value .... But it has refused to make a fetish even of 
market value, since that may not be the best measure of value 
in some cases.42 
Much of the burden for effecting reform in the methods for provid-
ing "just compensation," however, may have to be placed on the 
legislature rather than the courts. Commissions should be established 
to study the rules and procedures for effecting full compensation for 
property taken by eminent domain. Statutes providing full com-
pensation for incidental losses will effect a consistency in awards. 
Some states have already passed statutes which provide at least in part 
for incidental 10sses,43 and a Congressional study has already recom-
40Id. at 397-398, 224 N.E.2d at 192. 
41 See Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N.E.2d 148 
(1952). 
42 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). 
43 See e.g., Pa. Stats. Ann., title 26 (Purdon 1966). 
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mended legislation to place a greater burden on the federal govern-
ment to help effect "just compensation."44 
The problem of confusing the jury with complex economic facts 
and figures can be eliminated by using specially appointed commis-
sioners, rather than a jury, in cases involving condemnation. Although 
"just compensation" is a constitutional guarantee, there is no require-
ment of trial by jury.45 Under Rule 7lA of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the statutes of many states,46 commissioners, learned 
in the problems of valuation, may be used in certain situations to 
determine compensation. The commissioners' award is generally 
treated like a master's report and is appealable to a court.47 
It appears that these statutes have not been utilized to their fullest 
extent. This may result from the commissioners' determination being 
subject to a de novo trial, which represents the possibility of double 
adjudication. If commissioners could be integrated into the judicial 
condemnation proceeding in lieu of a jury, this problem would be 
solved. As an extension of the commissioner system, an entire system 
of courts specifically for eminent domain proceedings should be con-
sidered. The judges would be knowledgeable in problems of com-
pensation and could initiate effective, speedy trials with consistent 
holdings.48 
The problems of evaluating property taken by eminent domain 
are many and complex. These problems are confronting an increasing 
number of people as urban development and other government pro-
grams expand. The traditional rules of valuation and the market 
value concept, evolved in an agrarian society, are inadequate when 
applied in today's urban society. As Justice Holmes stated, the con-
stitution deals with people rather than property,49 and more attention 
should be given to the individual to insure his constitutional right to 
"just compensation." The public should bear the cost of all that is 
actually lost to the owner in condemnation proceedings, including 
incidental losses, as the price for public projects. 
CARY J. COEN 
44 See Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition, House Committee on Public 
Works, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Study of Compensation and Assistance for Persons 
Affected by Real Property Acquisition in Federal and Federally Assisted Programs 
(Comm. Print 1964). 
45 Baumann v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897). 
46 E.g., G.L., c. 80A, §8; 6 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain §26.53 (3d ed. 
rev. 1964). 
47 E.g., G.L., c. 80A, §§9-IO; 6 Nichols, note 46 supra, §26.531. 
48 See Searles and Raphael, Current Trends in the Law of Condemnation, 27 
Ford. L. Rev. 529 (1959). 
49 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). 
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